| Volume 5, Number 4, Article 7, Pages 361-375 |
doi:10.1167/5.4.7 |
http://journalofvision.org/5/4/7/ |
ISSN 1534-7362 |
Temporal dynamics in bistable perception
Pascal Mamassian |
CNRS & Université Paris 5, Boulogne-Billancourt, France |
|
Ross Goutcher |
Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, Scotland, UK |
|
Abstract
Bistable perception is fundamentally a dynamic process: Our perceptual experience continuously alternates when an ambiguous or rivalrous stimulus is observed. Here we present a method to analyze instantaneous measures of dominance and transition between percepts. The analysis extracts three time-varying probabilities. First, the transient preference represents the probability of perceiving one interpretation at one instant. Second, the reversal probability is the probability that the current percept will change at the next evaluation. Finally, the survival probabilities are the probability that at one instant the current percept will not switch to the alternative interpretation. We derive the relationships between these probabilities and offer a test of independence between consecutive percepts. We also introduce a simple technique to sample the observer’s perception at regular intervals. The analyzing method is illustrated with the example of binocular rivalry. We demonstrate Levelt’s second proposition with the survival probability measure and show that the consecutive rivalrous percepts are not independent.
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History
Received October 2, 2004; published April 27, 2005
Citation
Mamassian, P. & Goutcher, R. (2005). Temporal dynamics in bistable perception.
Journal of Vision, 5(4):7, 361-375,
http://journalofvision.org/5/4/7/,
doi:10.1167/5.4.7.
Keywords
bistability, perceptual dynamics, ambiguous perception, binocular rivalry, Levelt's second proposition
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Bistable perception arises when a stimulus can be
interpreted in two distinct ways. Two experimental situations have been
specifically designed to produce bistable perception. First, the stimulus can be
such that it does not contain enough information to lead to a unique
interpretation. Examples of such ambiguous stimuli are the Necker cube
(Necker, 1832; Attneave, 1971) and other three-dimensional objects
(e.g., Mamassian & Landy, 1998, 2001). The second experimental situation
occurs when the stimulus contains conflicting information about the plausible
interpretations. Examples of such rivalrous stimuli include those presented
during binocular rivalry (e.g., Wade, 1975a; Tong, 2001; Blake & Logothetis, 2002) and those where depth cues are in
conflict (van Ee, Adams, & Mamassian,
2003).
A full explanation of bistable perception involves an
understanding of why one of the percepts is perceived first and why percepts
alternate at a particular rate when the stimulus is continuously presented for a
long time. These two aspects of bistability are most likely intertwined: The
stronger a percept is, the more likely it will be perceived first and perceived
more often once the percepts start to alternate. Therefore, the mechanisms
responsible for the selection of the first percept and the rate of reversal to
the other are likely to involve common structures, although this has yet to be
demonstrated empirically.
The tools used to measure ambiguous and rivalrous
perception are however still rudimentary. Most measures are based on the concept
of the phase duration, which is the length of time during which one percept is
sustained. In his influential monograph on binocular rivalry, Levelt ( 1965) uses the mean dominance duration (the
mean of the phase durations), the relative predominance (percentage of the total
viewing time that one percept is reported), and the alternation rate. A more
detailed picture is obtained by reporting the whole distribution of phase
durations. Like most time distributions (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999), this distribution is positively
skewed, that is, short durations are more frequent than long ones (see Figure 2 below). There are thus several valid
probability distribution functions that can be used to fit the distribution of
phase durations (De Marco et al., 1977),
among which the most popular are the gamma (e.g., Levelt, 1967) and log-normal (e.g., Lehky, 1995) distributions. Best-fitting parameters
are then used to summarize the data.
Phase durations provide an important description of
bistable perception. Short phases are an indication of an unstable system, and
thus the search for the conditions that affect perceptual stability benefits
from the analysis of phase durations or alternation rates (e.g., Blake, Sobel,
& Gilroy, 2003). There are however two
issues with focusing on phase durations to study bistable perception.
First, the distribution of phase durations does not
really represent the dynamics of bistability because the times at which the
durations were recorded are not taken into account. Even if consecutive phase
durations are uncorrelated (e.g., Fox & Hermann, 1967), the distribution cannot capture slow
variations in the rate of reversals (see discussion on stationarity below). It is therefore appropriate to
look for an alternative measure that preserves the order of events.
The second issue arises once the distribution is fitted
with a gamma or other distribution. Surprisingly, these parameters are often
left completely uninterpreted. One consistent finding, though, is that the two
parameters of the gamma distribution
( λ and
r; see Figure 2) are strongly correlated (Borsellino et
al., 1972; De Marco et al., 1977) and often identical. While the
reason for this correlation is still not clear, it does indicate that the gamma
distribution has one degree of freedom too many.
In this study, we propose a simple method to record and
analyze bistable data. We argue that the analyzing method satisfactorily
addresses the two concerns highlighted above. Even though the analysis is
relatively independent of the way the data have been obtained, we also present a
straightforward way to record the observer’s percept at regular
intervals.
The usual approach in studying bistable perception is
to ask observers to press one of two keys whenever their percept changes. With
this method, there is a potential danger of contamination of the perceptual data
with the motor responses. For instance, the observers could re-evaluate the
stimulus whenever they press a key to reassure themselves that their response
really matches their percept, and this in turn might accelerate the reversal
rate. On the contrary, observers could momentarily release their attentional
focus, and potentially slow down their reversal rate. One way to avoid the
contamination of bistable perception with motor responses, including eye
movements and blinks, is to use afterimages (Wade, 1974, 1975b). However, this method is not
appropriate if one is interested in the changing percept with time. We propose
here an alternative way to record the observer’s time-varying
percepts.
In short, the method is as follows. Observers are
presented with an ambiguous stimulus and are prompted to report their percept
repeatedly at the sound of an auditory beep. The beeps are separated by an
average of 2 s with a random temporal jitter to preclude anticipation. Several
runs are recorded in this way for each experimental condition. The analysis then
consists of computing a survival probability, namely the probability that one
percept for one beep time survives onto the next beep. This survival probability
is computed for the whole duration of the run, thereby providing an
instantaneous representation of the perceptual dynamics. Two main aspects can
then be extracted from this survival probability: a time constant reflecting the
time to reach a stationary regime, and an asymptotic value reflecting the mean
survival probability in the stationary regime.
Next we provide the details of the method and apply it
to a classical case of binocular rivalry. In particular, we describe how the
method can be used to test Levelt’s second proposition. We conclude with a
discussion of the merits of our method over the more traditional approach of
reporting the parameters of the gamma
distribution. Experiment 1: The technique
We present our technique for studying the temporal
dynamics of bistable perception with the help of a binocular rivalrous stimulus.
Because this stimulus is very common (for a review, see Blake, 1989), it will be easy to compare our
technique with more conventional approaches. We use this example to define the
concepts of transient preference, reversal probability, and survival
probabilities. To track the temporal effects of an initial perceptual bias, we
impose a large contrast difference between the two eye’s
images.
Two undergraduate students (one male, one female) from
the University of Glasgow took part in this experiment. They were naïve
about the purpose of the experiment, gave their consent before running the
experiment, and were paid for their participation. Both observers had normal
visual acuity in both
eyes.
Stimuli were Gabor patches (sine wave gratings
modulated by a Gaussian envelope) oriented at ± 45 deg relative to the
vertical ( Figure 1A). The orientation of the
Gabors was randomized from one trial run to the next with the constraint that
the orientation in one eye was always orthogonal to that in the other eye. The
size of the Gabor was kept small to minimize fused or piecemeal percepts where
the interpretation is a mixture of the left and right images. The size (at
half-height of the Gaussian envelope) was 0.83 deg of visual angle in
diameter. The spatial frequency of the grating was set to 2.5 cycles/deg. The
contrast ratio between the left and right eye images was fixed to 25%. Which eye
saw the full-contrast Gabor and which eye saw the 25%-contrast Gabor was
randomized between trials. In the analyses below, we combine trials according to
the stimulus contrast, so we present our results relative to either the
high-contrast or low-contrast stimulus rather than left or right eye.
Figure 1. General methods. (A). Example of a
binocular rivalry stimulus used in this study. (B). Time course of a run of
trials. Once the visual stimulus is on, an auditory beep is presented at
intervals of approximately 2 s. Observers have to report their current
interpretation (here, Left or
Right orientation) at the time of the
beeps.
Figure 2. Phase-duration analysis for the two
observers in Experiment 1. The distributions of
phase durations are well fit by a two-parameter
( λ,
r) gamma distribution of the form
g( x)=[ λrxr-1/Γ( r)]exp(- λx), where Γ is the gamma function. The phase durations have been normalized
to their respective means
( μ) before the
fitting procedure was applied.
The stimuli were surrounded by a frame composed of
small squares, half of them black, the others white. This frame was
non-rivalrous (same contrast in both eyes) and had zero
disparity. Stimuli were presented on a split-screen Wheatstone
stereoscope where the display was a 21-in Sony Trinitron CRT monitor driven by
an Apple PowerMac computer. The experiment was controlled by a program that ran
under Matlab using the PsychToolbox functions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The experiment was run in a dark room
and the observers had to place their heads in a chin- and head-rest to minimize
head movements. The viewing distance was 80
cm.
Observers were repeatedly prompted to report the
perceived orientation of the Gabor at the sound of an auditory beep ( Figure 1B). Beeps were presented on average every
2 s, starting 1 s after the stimulus onset. A small temporal jitter was
introduced to reduce anticipatory responses. This jitter was drawn from a
uniform distribution extending 500 ms before and after the planned mean
time occurrence of the beeps. In practice, the first beep could therefore occur
anytime between 0.5 s and 1.5 s after stimulus onset, the next beep anytime
between 2.5 s and 3.5 s, and so on.
Observers had to press one of two keys with their left
or right index fingers, reporting their percept at the time of the beep. If
uncertain, they were asked to choose the percept that appeared the strongest.
Responses made more than 1 s after the beep were discarded. This strict
constraint allowed us to ascertain that a response did not interact with the
next beep. To minimize the probability of missing the first beep, a count-down
from 5 s before the stimulus onset was displayed on the monitor. The
zero-disparity frame was also presented during this count-down to help stabilize
vergence before stimulus onset.
In this first experiment, the presentation duration of
a run (the time when the Gabors were shown) was set to 50 s. Each observer ran
100 such runs (50 at each contrast ratio balanced across the two eyes) with a
short break between consecutive
runs.
The results are split in phase durations, transient
preference, reversal probability, and survival probabilities.
The traditional way to analyze data from bistable
experiments is to report the distribution of the phase durations. Phase
durations of each dominant percept (here the orientation of the high- and
low-contrast Gabors) can be computed by counting the consecutive number of times
that a given percept is reported to be identical. For instance, if the same
orientation is perceived for three consecutive beeps before the percept reverses
to the other orientation, this particular phase will be assigned a duration of 6
s (3 times the inter-beep interval of 2 s).
It is clear that the phase durations we have recorded
are affected by the inter-beep interval. We missed phase durations shorter than
2 s, but also slightly exaggerated all phase durations (by combining two phases
that were separated by a missed phase). More discussions of this issue can be
found in Appendix D.
Figure 2 illustrates
the distribution of phase durations for the high-contrast percepts for the two
observers (the low-contrast percepts had similar distributions but fewer bins).
In these plots, the phase durations have been normalized relative to their
respective means ( μ =
9.15 s and
7.60 s for observers DM and KM,
respectively). The distribution of these phase durations follows a sharp rise
and a slow fall that is well summarized by a gamma distribution (Levelt, 1965). The best-fitted parameters for the
gamma distribution fall between 2 and 3, and this is consistent with numerous
previous studies (for references, see Blake & Logothetis, 2002). From this analysis of the phase
durations, it seems therefore that our method of recording the dynamics of
binocular rivalry did not substantially affect the pattern of
responses.
What the phase-duration analysis fails to capture,
however, is the time course of the percepts. A natural depiction of this time
course is provided by the transient preference. The transient preference is
simply the proportion of percepts consistent with one of the two
interpretations, here arbitrarily chosen as the high-contrast Gabor. This
proportion is computed by taking the average of the percepts across all runs,
separately for each beep time.
Not surprisingly, both observers show an initial strong
bias for reporting the orientation of the high-contrast image. The initial bias
is in fact so consistent with the high-contrast image that the transient
probability is not significantly different from 1 at the first beep.
Interestingly though, this initial bias gradually wears off and the transient
preference reaches a stable regime ( Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Transient preference for the two observers in Experiment 1. The transient preference is the
proportion of responses corresponding to the high-contrast image for each beep
occurrence. There is a strong initial bias for the high-contrast image, but this
bias wears off after several seconds for both observers. The procedure used to
estimate the time constant
τ of this
process is illustrated in red on the top graph. Error bars indicate standard
error of the means.
To summarize the dynamics of transient preferences, we
fit the data with a scaled cumulative Gaussian with 3 degrees of freedom (see Appendix A). The first degree of freedom
α is the asymptotic value of the
stationary regime. The second degree of freedom τ is the time constant to
reach the stable regime. Finally, the third degree of freedom
σ is the slope of the function
at its inflexion point. We define the time constant as the time at the
intersection of the asymptotic line and the tangent at the inflexion point (see
Figure 3 and Appendix A).
Both observers show similar asymptotic values in the
stationary regime (α = 0.709 and
0.708 for observers DM and KM, respectively). In spite of this similarity, the
observers took different amounts of time to reach these stationary regimes
(τ = 21.5 s and 7.3 s,
respectively). This fundamental difference in temporal dynamics between
observers was not readily visible in the phase-duration
analysis.
While the transient preference is a good description of
the current percept, it is not a measure of the stability of that percept. We
define the reversal probability as the probability that the current percept will
change at the next beep, irrespective of the current percept. The reversal
probability therefore reflects how fast percepts change. If we let
v represent the
reversal probability and
u the alternation
rate (in number of changes per second),
then , | (1) |
where
σ is the mean inter-beep
interval (here 2 s). In other words, the higher the reversal probability, the
faster the alternation rate. We should note that in this equation,
v ≤ 1 because
it is a probability. If the reversal probability is too close to 1 for comfort,
the experimenter should attempt to reduce the inter-beep interval or avoid the
use of the discrete sampling technique. As a conservative rule, we suggest that
caution is exercised if
v >
0.5. Similarly to the analysis of the transient preference,
the reversal probability is strongly biased at first and gradually reaches a
stable regime ( Figure 4). The initial bias is
in favor of a slow alternation rate, so much so that for our stimulus, the
initial reversal probability is not significantly different from zero. We fit
these data with a scaled cumulative Gaussian, again with 3 degrees of freedom
(see Appendix A). The first degree of freedom is
the asymptotic value of the stationary regime and is very similar between
observers ( α = 0.373 and 0.366
for observers DM and KM, respectively). The second degree of freedom is the time
constant to reach the stable regime and is defined as for the transient
preference (i.e., the intersection of the asymptotic line and the tangent at the
inflexion point). The third degree of freedom is the slope of the function at
its inflexion point and is positive for both observers, indicating that the
alternation rate progressively increases within a run of trials.
Figure 4. Reversal probability for the two
observers in Experiment 1. The reversal
probability is the probability that the current percept will change at the next
beep. From the time constant of the fitted function, we can isolate the initial
nonstationary regime (on the left side of the dashed vertical line).
We shall use the reversal probability as a measure of
stationarity: When the reversal probability is stable over time, we can say that
the alternation of percepts has reached its stationary regime. The fitted time
constants τ are very different
between the two observers, observer DM being much slower to reach a stationary
regime than KM
( τ = 19.5 s and
5.3 s, respectively). The start of the stationary regime can be defined as time
(τ + σ)
where the added σ reflects the
fact that reversal probability refers to the predicted percept at the next beep.
These values (21.5 s and 7.3 s, respectively) match very well the time constants
found for the transient preference. Note however that there is no particular
relationship between the transient preference and the reversal probability (for
details, see Appendix B). In particular, if the
two percepts were matched in strength, we would expect a balanced transient
preference from the start of the run (i.e., 0.5), and yet we may still observe a
reversal probability resembling the one found here. It is for this reason that
we define the duration of the nonstationary regime from the reversal probability
and not simply from the transient
preference.
The transient preference and reversal probability
describe the time course of the current percept and the stability of that
percept. Another way to represent this information is to use the survival
probabilities. The survival probability is the likelihood that the next percept
will be identical to the current one. It is defined as a conditional probability
on the current percept (see Appendices B and C for its precise definition). There are therefore
two distinct survival probabilities, depending on whether the current percept is
that of the high- or low-contrast image.
Survival probabilities for our two observers are shown
in Figure 5. There are two curves for each
observer, one corresponding to the percept linked to the high-contrast stimulus
(in filled blue symbols) and the other to the low-contrast stimulus (in open red
symbols). The larger error bars for the low-contrast percepts simply reflect the
fact that there were fewer measurements available to estimate these
probabilities. As with the previous two analyses, the survival probabilities
were fitted with scaled cumulative Gaussian functions ( Appendix A). We focus our attention on the
asymptotic values of the best fits.
Figure 5. Survival probabilities for the two
observers in Experiment 1. The survival
probability is the conditional probability that the next percept will be
identical to the current one. The two different percepts here are the
orientation corresponding to the high-contrast stimulus
( H, in blue) and the orientation of the
low-contrast stimulus ( L, in red).
Error bars were used for the maximum likelihood fit and are proportional to the
inverse of the square root of the number of samples (large error bars indicate a
small number of samples).
For both observers, the survival probability of the
high-contrast percept is larger than the one for the low-contrast percept. In
other words, if the high-contrast stimulus is the one perceived at one instant,
it has a larger probability to survive to the next beep than if it were the
low-contrast stimulus. This result was to be expected because we already saw
that the high-contrast stimulus was chosen more often ( Figure 3). The analysis of the survival
probabilities allows us to split the contribution of each stimulus to the
high-contrast dominance. Asymptotic values for the high-contrast percept were
αH = 0.740
and 0.744 for observers DM and KM, respectively, compared to the asymptotic
values for the low-contrast percept
αL = 0.369
and 0.393, respectively.
The survival probabilities are transient measures of
dominance: The higher the survival probability of one percept, the more likely
this percept will be sustained and the less likely the other percept will arise.
There is therefore a direct relationship between the transient preference and
the survival probabilities (see Appendix B).
Similarly, the reversal probability can also be expressed as a function of the
survival probabilities (see again Appendix
B).
Because both the transient preference and the reversal
probability can be expressed as a function of the survival probabilities, these
latter two are sufficient to describe the temporal dynamics of bistability by
themselves. Note that this description is valid here only to the first order
(that is, how the current state will affect the next state). Higher order
survival probabilities can be defined with a history going back a few beeps. For
instance, a second-order description would be obtained by measuring how the next
state depends on the current and previous states. These higher order
descriptions are beyond the scope of this study (e.g., see Maloney, Dal
Martello, Sahm, & Spillmann,
2005). Experiment 2: Stationarity
The first experiment allowed us to define our procedure
to measure and analyze bistable perceptions. In a second experiment, we test the
robustness of the technique on a larger population of observers. In addition, we
extend the duration of the runs six-fold to ensure that beyond the critical time
constant, the regime of alternations is indeed
stationary.
Seventeen undergraduate students from the University of
Glasgow took part in this experiment. Six more ran the experiment but were later
discarded because they missed too many responses (see Procedure below). All were naïve to the
purpose of the experiment, gave their written consent, and were paid for their
participation. The observers had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity in
both
eyes.
Stimuli were the binocular rivalrous Gabors used in Experiment 1. The contrast of the left and right
eye images were set to 100% and 25%, respectively.
Observers were repeatedly prompted to report the
perceived orientation of the Gabor at the sound of an auditory beep. Responses
made more than 1 s after the beep were discarded. If an observer missed more
than 25% of the total number of responses, he or she was discarded. While this
threshold may appear large, one has to remember that this experiment involved
naïve participants who were not particularly thrilled to look at rivalrous
Gabors in a dark room for an hour. Experienced observers have almost no missed
responses (see previous experiment).
In this second experiment, the presentation duration of
a run (the time the Gabors were shown) was extended to 5 min. Each observer ran
eight such runs with a short break between consecutive
runs.
The transient preference for the high-contrast stimulus
is shown in Figure 6. Similarly to Experiment 1, there is a strong initial bias that
wears off after about 6 s. The mean preference in the stationary regime is
0.613. There is no apparent change in transient preference beyond the critical
time constant.
Figure 6.
Transient preference for Experiment 2. The plot
shows the mean preference across all observers for the high-contrast
interpretation. Error bars are standard errors between observers.
The reversal probability is shown in Figure 7. It slowly increases before reaching a
stationary regime at 0.455. Contrary to the previous experiment, the initial
reversal probability is significantly greater than zero, possibly reflecting the
long-lasting effects of a six-fold increase in presentation time. A fit with a
scaled cumulative Gaussian allows us to isolate the initial nonstationary
regime, which lasts 27 s on average across all
observers.
Figure 7. Reversal probability for Experiment 2. Once the stationary regime is reached
(on average after 27 s), the reversal probability is constant.
The survival probability for the high-contrast
interpretation was consistently larger than that of the low-contrast
interpretation ( Figure 8). Beyond the time
constant, the survival probabilities stayed constant. In the stationary regime,
the fitted asymptotic values were
αH = 0.62
and
αL = 0.42.
Figure 8. Survival probabilities for Experiment 2. The survival probabilities are shown
in red up-triangles and blue down-triangles for the high-contrast and
low-contrast stimuli, respectively.
The survival probabilities provide a direct test for
the independence of consecutive responses. Two consecutive responses are
independent if the next percept cannot be predicted from the current one.
Interestingly, a condition of independence is that the two survival
probabilities sum to 1 (see Appendix C). Figure 9 shows the distribution of survival
probabilities across all observers for Experiment
2 (once they have reached the stationary regime). The sums of the pairs of
survival probabilities for each observer are on average larger than 1 (mean:
1.050; SE across observers: 0.029),
indicating that consecutive percepts are not independent. This result is
seemingly in contradiction with previous reports that have consistently argued
for independence (Fox & Hermann, 1967;
Blake, Fox, & McIntyre, 1971; Walker,
1975; Lehky, 1995). However, it is important to remember
that their independence test was on consecutive phase durations rather than
consecutive percepts. Our dependence result might reflect the gradual build-up
of adaptation to one percept while this percept is surviving, whereas the
independence of phase durations suggests that the adaptation is reset whenever a
transition
occurs.
Figure 9. Independence test. The survival
probabilities for both low- and high-contrast interpretations are plotted
against each other for each observer. The green dashed line represents the
constraint for two consecutive percepts to be independent.
Experiment 3: Perceptual
biases
The first two experiments have demonstrated the use of
the survival probabilities to describe the temporal dynamics of bistable
perception. In this third experiment, we look at how the survival probabilities
vary with the strength of the competing stimuli. We vary the relative strength
of each stimulus by altering the contrast of the stimulus in one or the other
eye.
Twenty-two naive undergraduate students took part in
this experiment. Seven of these participants were discarded because they failed
to respond quickly enough (see Procedure below). The analysis below was carried
out on the 15 remaining
participants.
Stimuli were identical to those used in the previous
experiment, except that six contrast conditions were used. The contrast ratios
between the right and left eyes were chosen equi-distant on a log-scale: 0.5,
0.66, 0.87, 1.15, 1.52, or 2.0. The first three contrasts were obtained by
setting the contrast of the left eye to 1.0 and varying the contrast of the
right eye between 0.5 and 0.87 (see legend of Figure 13); the last three contrasts were
similarly obtained by exchanging the roles of the left and right
eyes.
The procedure was similar to that used in the previous
experiment. Observers ran eight consecutive blocks of runs where each block
contained one run for each contrast ratio, presented in random order. Observers
took a short break between each run and a longer break between each block.
The inter-beep interval was again 2 s on average and
participants had to respond within 1 s after each beep. Those participants who
missed more than 25% of the responses were removed from the final
analysis.
As expected, the higher the contrast of one eye’s
image, the larger the probability that the interpretation is consistent with
that image. This behavior can be readily seen by looking at the transient
preference to report seeing the image presented to the right eye ( Figure 10). As for the previous experiments, the
transient preference was fitted with a scaled cumulative
Gaussian.
Figure 10. Time-varying transient preferences for
the right-eye image in Experiment 3. Each plot
corresponds to a different contrast ratio between the two monocular images
(right eye over left eye). Error bars are standard errors between
observers.
The transient preference increases (positive slope
parameter) if the asymptotic value is less than 0.5, and decreases (negative
slope) if the asymptotic value is more than 0.5. This relationship between the
slope and the asymptote accentuates the effect of contrast for the initial
transient preference. While the asymptote changes modestly with contrast, the
initial interpretation is dramatically influenced by contrast. To reveal this
effect further, we have isolated the very first interpretation (at the first
beep) from the subsequent ones. Figure 11A
shows how the first response changes with contrast, and separately, how the mean
subsequent responses change with contrast. The change in slope of the fitted
cumulative Gaussians shows the difference between the very first response and
the other responses. In spite of this difference, there is still a very good
correlation between the two ( Figure 11B).
Hupé and Rubin ( 2003) found a
similar exaggerated bias of the first response for bistable motion
stimuli.
Figure 11. Comparison of mean initial and
subsequent responses in Experiment 3. (A). The
mean first response (red open symbols) rises quickly with contrast ratio,
whereas the mean subsequent responses (filled blue symbols) rise much more
slowly with contrast ratio. (B).There is a very good correlation between the
mean first response and the subsequent responses (Pearson’s correlation,
R = 0.79).
The survival probabilities for the left and right eye
images cross over as the contrast ratio varies between 0.5 and 2 ( Figure 12). As expected, the survival probability
is larger for the image that has the higher contrast, and the difference in
survival probabilities reduces as the contrast ratio gets close to
1.
Figure 12. Time-varying survival probabilities
for Experiment 3. Red up-triangles now refer to
the left-eye image, blue down-triangles to the right-eye image. The survival
probabilities cross over as the contrast ratio increases over unity.
If we restrict ourselves to the stationary regimes, we
can plot the asymptotic value of the survival probabilities as a function of the
contrast ratio ( Figure 13). Values of the
contrast ratio between 0.5 and 1.0 were obtained by fixing the contrast of the
left eye image to 1.0 and increasing the contrast of the right image between 0.5
and 1.0. We note that in this range of the contrast ratios, the asymptotic value
of the left survival probability varies more rapidly than that of the right
survival probability (the slope of the line relating survival asymptote to
contrast ratio is –0.246 vs. –0.079 for the left and right survival
probabilities, respectively). Conversely, in the range of contrast ratios larger
than 1.0, obtained by fixing the contrast of the right eye image, it is the
right survival probability that varies faster with contrast ratio (slopes of
0.040 vs. 0.213 for the left and right survival probabilities, respectively).
The ratio of the slopes between the most affected and the least affected eyes is
close to 4 (3.1 and 5.3 for the ranges [0.5, 1] and [1, 2],
respectively).
Figure 13.
Effect of contrast on the asymptote of the survival probabilities for Experiment 3. The two horizontal bars below
represent the contrast of each eye to produce a given contrast ratio. The
survival probabilities approximate Levelt’s second proposition: Increasing
the contrast of one eye’s image mainly decreases the dominance of the
other eye.
This behavior is in close agreement with Levelt’s
second proposition (Levelt, 1965, 1966). According to Levelt, an increase of
the stimulus strength in one eye does not increase the mean duration of the
ipsilateral percept, but instead reduces the mean duration of the contralateral
percept. More recent studies have found a weak but significant effect of the
mean dominant duration of the ipsilateral eye (Mueller & Blake, 1989; Bossink, Stalmeier, & de
Weert, 1993). We found here that even
though a change of strength of one eye’s image does affect the survival
probability of that image, this effect is 4 times smaller than the effect on the
other eye’s image. In other words, an increase in stimulus strength in one
eye does not dramatically boost the survival probability of that eye, but
instead greatly decreases the survival probability of the other eye.
One final analysis consists in looking at the
relationship between the two survival probabilities for different contrast
ratios ( Figure 14). We again restrict ourselves
to the stationary regime. We can see that the sum of the two survival
probabilities is always larger than 1, indicating that two consecutive percepts
are never independent. The lack of independence (as indicated by a departure
from 1 for the sum of the survival probabilities) seems to increase for more
unbalanced stimuli (as the contrast ratio deviates from
1).
Figure 14. Relationship between the asymptotic
value of the survival probabilities in Experiment
3. The sum of the two survival probabilities (for the left [LE] and right
(RE) eyes) is always greater than 1, indicating that two consecutive percepts
are not independent.
In this work, we have presented a procedure for
analyzing the temporal dynamics of ambiguous and rivalrous perception. The
procedure consists of measuring the time-course of the survival probability of
each interpretation, that is the probability that the current percept will be
sustained for a short duration.
We see several advantages in reporting survival
probabilities. First, the survival probability is a transient measure of
perception and is therefore relevant for the study of the temporal dynamics of
bistable perception. Second, it is sufficient to estimate several other
characteristics, such as the transient preference (instantaneous probability of
seeing one percept) and the reversal probability (instantaneous probability of
experiencing a change of percept). Third, it contains critical information about
whether the first response is more biased than the subsequent responses and
about the duration of the initial nonstationary regime. Fourth, it provides a
test of independence for percepts taken at regular intervals.
The report of survival probabilities should provide a
finer measure of similarity between two bistable processes. Previous studies
that tested whether two conditions had similar temporal dynamic properties had
to rely on the mean alternation rate (Andrews & Purves, 1997; Chen & He, 2003; van Ee, 2005) or on the gamma distribution
(Logothetis, Leopold, & Sheinberg,
1996; Leopold & Logothetis,
1999). It will be of interest to compare the asymptotic values and time
constants of the survival probabilities in these experiments. While we prefer
the procedure described in this work to collect the survival probabilities, it
is also possible to estimate these entities from existent experiments that were
obtained with the more traditional method of continuous data collection (see Appendix
D).
One may question the effect of presenting regular beeps
on the dynamics of bistable perception. It is indeed possible that these beeps
will influence the subjective state of the observer. However, given that the
rate of beeps is identical for all observers and for all conditions, this
influence should be constant throughout the course of a trial and across
conditions. Consider the result that phase durations are longer at the beginning
of the trial than in the middle and end. With the continuous response method,
the observer would press a key less often at the beginning of the trial. In
contrast, with the discrete method, the beeps and the responses occur at the
same rate throughout the trial. Overall, one could argue that the discrete
sampling method constrains the attentional load of the observer. If confirmed to
be true in future studies, this would be a serious advantage for the discrete
method because different bistable stimuli are affected differently by attention
(e.g., Lack, 1978; Meng & Tong, 2004; van Ee, van Dam, & Brouwer, 2005). Potentially, the lack of
attentional control may also participate in the large inter-subject variability
typically reported in bistable experiments (e.g., Carter & Pettigrew, 2003). More work is clearly needed to
compare the continuous and discrete recording methods.
Our analyzing method can also easily be generalized to
multistable perception where the observer’s percepts alternate between
more than two interpretations. In this case, as many survival probabilities
should be defined as there are distinct percepts. In addition, transition
probabilities should be introduced to test whether some transitions between two
percepts are favored over others (as shown by Suzuki & Grabowecky, 2002). While we can anticipate that the
survival probabilities will reach a stationary regime similarly to that found in
this study, the transition probabilities might follow very different
dynamics.
Another extension of our method is to consider higher
order conditional probabilities. We have restricted ourselves to determine how
well the next percept can be predicted from the current one (first-order
analysis), and it will be interesting to include the knowledge of the previous
percept (second order) as well as older percepts. Ultimately, one could look at
the probability of a reversal as a function of time since the last reversal,
which is sometimes called the “hazard function” (Taylor &
Aldridge, 1974). These analyses should
provide strong constraints for plausible models of bistable perception (e.g.,
Dayan, 1998; Laing & Chow, 2002; Wilson, 2003).
In summary, we have proposed a technique to measure and
analyze some of the fundamental properties of the temporal dynamics of ambiguous
and rivalrous perception. We are currently measuring the survival probabilities
in a variety of bistable stimuli to compare the similarities across stimuli and
tasks. Appendix A: Fitting functions
The transient preference, reversal probability, and
survival probabilities share a similar time-course. We chose to represent this
temporal function by a scaled cumulative Gaussian with 3 degrees of freedom. The
3 degrees of freedom are the asymptotic probability
( α) in the stationary regime,
the time constant ( τ) to reach
that stationary regime, and the slope
( σ) of the function at the
inflection point. The time constant is defined as the intersection of the
asymptotic line and the tangent of the function at the inflexion point (see Figure 3). The fitting function comes in two
types, depending on whether the function is monotonically increasing (positive
σ) or decreasing (negative
σ).
Let
G(m,
s,
t)
represent the usual cumulative Gaussian distribution with mean
m and
variance
s2
at time t
 | (2) |
The scaled cumulative Gaussian fitting function
H is then
defined as follows. When σ >
0,  | (3) |
Alternatively, when
σ <
0,  | (4) |
The function
H
presents a singularity at σ
= 0. By convention, we shall
define . | (5) |
The 3 degrees of freedom of the scaled cumulative
function
H were
adjusted to the data with a maximum likelihood procedure that took into account
the variability of each data point to estimate the best
fit. Appendix B: Survival probability
The knowledge of the survival probabilities is
sufficient to infer the mean transient preference and the reversal probability.
We detail here the relationships between these different entities.
Let σ
be the mean sampling interval (i.e., 2 s in our experiments). Let also
R(t) be the event
representing the fact that the right eye’s image is perceived at time
t [and similarly
for the left eye’s image
L(t)].
Given that the two eyes’ images are the only two possible interpretations,
we
have . | (6) |
The survival probability for the right eye’s
image
sR(t)
is the probability that a percept
R at time
t will
survive at time
(t + σ).
It is therefore defined as the conditional
probability . | (7) |
The survival probability of the left
eye’s image
sL(t)
is similarly defined. Note that
sR(t)
and
sL(t)
do not necessarily sum to one (see Appendix C).
With the knowledge of the survival probabilities,
we can estimate the transient preference at the next beep
p(R(t + σ))  | (8) |
In the stationary regime, we
have  | (9) |
and Equation 8
for the transient preference reduces
to . | (10) |
This relationship between transient
preference and survival probabilities is illustrated in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Contour plot of the relationship
between the transient preference and the survival probabilities. Each blue line
represents the pairs of survival probabilities that are compatible with a given
transient preference (indicated by the number on the line). The two red dots
represent the two observers in Experiment 1. The
green dashed line indicates the independence constraint (see Appendix C).
In a similar way, the probability
v(t) that the
current percept will reverse at the next beep can be expressed
as  | (11) |
In the stationary regime, we can use the expression we
found for the transient preference probability ( Equation 10). In doing this, the reversal
probability reduces
to . | (12) |
The relationship between the reversal probability and
the survival probabilities is illustrated in Figure
16.
Figure 16. Contour plot of the relationship
between the reversal probability and the survival probabilities. Each blue curve
represents the pairs of survival probabilities that are compatible with given
reversal probabilities (indicated by the number on the line). The red dots and
the green line are identical to that of Figure
15.
A comparison between Figures 15 and 16
makes it clear that there are no simple relationships between the transient
preference and the reversal probabilities. In other words, the transient
preference and reversal probability represent different aspects of the temporal
dynamics of bistability, but both of these aspects can be described from the
knowledge of the survival
probabilities.
How independent are consecutive responses? This
question can be answered easily thanks to the survival probabilities. We first
list all four possible transitions between consecutive responses and their
corresponding expressions in terms of survival
probabilities:  | (13) |
If one percept is independent of the previous one, then
these conditional probabilities reduce
to  | (14) |
From these equations, the following constraint
emerges: . | (15) |
This constraint is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the percepts to be selected independently of the previous ones. The
constraint is depicted as a green dashed line in Figures 15 and 16.
When the percepts are independent, the transient
preference and reversal probabilities simplify. In the stationary regime, we can
take back Equations 10 and 12 derived in Appendix
B to
find  | (16) |
Appendix D: Continuous data
In this Appendix, we report a simple procedure to
reanalyze previous data sets that were collected with the usual method of asking
observers to report any change of percept as soon as it occurred. While we
prefer our method of data collection, because it allows for a better control of
the observer’s attention, the following procedure might be helpful to
extract survival probabilities of existing data sets.
We ran six observers with the same stimuli as in the
first and second experiments (contrast ratio of 0.25), presented for 5 min at a
time. Observers saw eight such sessions. Instead of responding at regular
intervals, observers were given two keys assigned to the two possible
interpretations (left- and right-oriented Gabors) and asked to press a key
continuously according to their current percept. If their percept was a fusion
of the two interpretations, they were allowed to press both keys
simultaneously.
To compute the survival probabilities in an experiment
where observers report continuously their percept, we need to sample the data at
regular intervals. For the sake of comparison, we sampled the data with a period
of 2 s, starting 1 s after the onset of the stimulus ( Figure
17).
Figure 17.
Conversion between continuous and discrete sampling. Only the first 60 s of a
5-min run are shown. Times when the two keys were pressed simultaneously are
assigned a percept value of 1.5.
It is clear that such a coarse sampling is likely to
miss transitory percepts shorter than 2 s, and erroneously mix consecutive
identical percepts that are separated by a very short transient. As a result,
the mean phase durations will be exaggerated in the sampled version of the
continuous data (on average across observers by 15.2% in our experiment).
However, this exaggeration affects all conditions similarly, and is therefore of
little concern as long as the experimenter is aware of it. In addition, it is
fair to remember that even with continuous data collection, very short phases
are likely to be missed because of the observers’ unwillingness to press
two keys in very fast alternation. Our discrete method of data collection has
the advantage of being objective in setting the threshold for the smallest phase
analyzed.
Sampled data were averaged together for the six
observers. The survival probabilities look similar to those reported in the
other experiments detailed in this manuscript ( Figure 18). The asymptotic values are 0.55 and
0.67 for the low- and high-contrast interpretations,
respectively.
Figure 18. Survival probabilities for the sampled
continuous data averaged across observers. The distributions resemble those
found with the discreet data collection method discussed in the
manuscript.
This work started while both authors were at the
University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK. It was first presented at the
European Conference on Visual Perception in Paris, France, in September 2003. We
acknowledge the support of Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
Grant GR/R57157/01 (UK). We thank David McCormick and Katherine McArthur for
help with the data collection and Tim Andrews, Randolph Blake, Jean-Michel
Hupé, Laurence Maloney, Satoru Suzuki, Frank Tong, Raymond van Ee, and
Nick Wade for their comments on an earlier draft of this
manuscript. Commercial relationships:
none.
Corresponding author: Pascal Mamassian.
Email: pascal.mamassian@univ-paris5.fr.
Address: CNRS UMR 8581, Université Paris
5, 71 ave. Edouard Vaillant, 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt,
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